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
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
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# Indian Epistemology and Metaphysics

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## Self or No-Self? The Ātman Debate in Classical Indian Philosophy\*

Alex Watson

### Introduction

What is the (essential/ultimate) nature of sentient beings such as people? The main traditions of classical Indian philosophy could be divided into four groups according to the answer they give to this metaphysical question. The first group, containing just one member, the Cārvākas, held that a person is just a body and the powers or properties of that body. They thus denied the possibility of the continuation of life after death. All other traditions claimed that people include a nonphysical constituent, which is their core identity and which survives the death of the body. Do these immaterial entities remain permanently separate from each other or do they—at the time of liberation—lose their separate identities and merge into a greater whole? The latter answer was given by those in the second group: Advaita Vedāntins, Nondualistic Śaivas, and certain Pāñcarātrika Vaiṣṇavas.<sup>1</sup> For them, individual souls/selves are identical with, or parts, emanations, evolutes, effects, or contractions of, an Oversoul or Absolute Self, named by the respective traditions as Brahman, Śiva, and Nārāyaṇa. The two remaining groups agree that the nonphysical parts of people remain forever distinct from each other; they disagree over whether they should be characterized as souls/selves or not. For the Buddhists they should not; for those in the final fourth group—for example, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā, Sāṅkhya, Śaiva Siddhānta, Jainism—they should.

This chapter does not concern itself at all with the first two groups. It looks at some debates between the last two—between, on the one hand, the Buddhists, and, on the other, those traditions that posited individual selves that remain permanently numerically distinct, there being no sense in which these selves are ultimately one. What precisely was the issue here? What was at stake in the question of whether that part of us that survives the death of the body should be termed a “self” or not? Section 1 provides an answer to that question by identifying key points of dispute in the debate between Nyāya and Buddhism. Section 2 introduces the Śaiva Siddhānta view, honoring its self-representation as falling in the middle ground between Nyāya and Buddhism.<sup>2</sup> Section



## 1.2 Self as substance


The Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas distinguished substances (*dravyas*) from qualities (*guṇas*), the former being property-possessors (*dharmins*) and the latter properties (*dharmas*). A thing, such as a pot or a mango, is a property-possessor, and it has five qualities—taste, smell, color, and so on—corresponding to our five senses.

The thing was regarded as a separate ontological entity from its qualities, as indicated by our use of language when we say, “the smell of the mango,” implying that the mango is something that exists over and above its smell. Nevertheless a quality is inextricably linked to a substance. It cannot exist without one. We do not find a color existing alone in midair. There must be some substantial object to which it belongs, some substrate (*āśraya*) that locates it.

The Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas use this principle to argue for the existence of the self. Just as colors or smells presuppose substances to which they belong, so consciousness presupposes a substance to which it belongs, that substance being the self.<sup>6</sup>

The Buddhists denied the existence of a self conceived of as the substance to which consciousness belongs. This was part of a more general denial of the existence of substances over and above qualities.<sup>7</sup> Whereas to a Naiyāyika a mango is one thing with five qualities, to a Buddhist it is five things occurring together, that is, at the same time and in the same place.<sup>8</sup> This is illustrated in Figure 12.4, taking the large circle to refer to a mango, and the small circles to refer to its smell, taste, color, and so on. Or the large circle can equally well represent a self, in which case the diagram illustrates that for Nyāya consciousness and so on belong to a self, whereas for Buddhism consciousness and the other four constituents (*skandha*) of a person exist together, as part of a conglomeration, without belonging to anything else.<sup>9</sup>

By disputing that colors, smells, and so on belong to a substance, Buddhism calls into question the very concept of a quality (*guṇatva*). Inasmuch as the concept itself implies the concept of a substance, being one incomplete half of a substance-quality distinction, Buddhism does away with talk of qualities.<sup>10</sup> It refers to the things that are termed “qualities” by Nyāya as simply parts (*deśa*) of a conglomeration (*samudāya*, *samūha*, *saṅghāta*).<sup>11</sup> Furthermore, whenever we use expressions that might seem to describe parts as belonging to a whole, such as “the trees of the forest” or “the color of the mango,” the term for the whole should not be taken to imply the existence of anything other than the sum of the parts. It refers not to a unity, but to a conglomeration of



12.4

elements: a particular group of trees in the first case, a particular group of five sensible properties in the second.

## 1.3 Self as agent

The Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas also conceived of the self as the agent of physical actions (*kartṛ*), and the agent/subject of cognitions (*jñātr*). (In Figure 12.5 the continuous line on the left to which all of the circles are attached represents the agent; the circles represent either physical actions or cognitions.) On the one hand it is that which, through the impulse of its will/effort (*prayatna*), initiates all of our physical actions. On the other it is the perceiver of our perceptions, the thinker of our thoughts, and so on. The perception of a pot, say, lasts just for an instant but its perceiver outlives that perception and is the perceiver of the next and subsequent perceptions.

For Buddhists that which brings about a physical action is just that which causes it, which for them is the intention that occurred in the stream of consciousness in the moment preceding the action. The Vaiśeṣikas had compared the self as instigator of bodily movements to a puppeteer instigating the bodily movements of a puppet below.<sup>12</sup> Such a notion of an agent standing above the sequence of mental and physical actions is precisely what is denied by the Buddhists. The intention that brings about my present action of touching the computer keyboard was itself caused by the previous moment of consciousness, and so on. There is no part of a person standing outside this chain of mental and physical events; each event is conditioned by the previous ones and brings the next one into existence, and there is nothing over and above this causal chain that is unconditioned. So Buddhism, by bringing the agent down from its lofty position, dividing it up into discrete moments of intention, and dispersing them into the psychophysical stream, replaces a two-tier model with a one-tier one.<sup>13</sup>

How did the Buddhists dispute the Naiyāyika and Vaiśeṣika notion of the self as the agent/subject of cognition? For Buddhism the agent of a cognition (*jñātr/grāhaka*) is simply the cognition itself (*jñāna/grahaṇa*). That which is conscious of a pot is consciousness at that particular moment. So if two consecutive cognitions occur to me, verbalizable as “I see a pot” and “I see a cloth,” the two occurrences of “I” have two different referents: two different instances of consciousness.

No two physical actions share a common agent, because each has its own separate prior intention; no two cognitions, or mental actions, share a common agent, because each is its own agent. In both cases the agent of the first action exhausted itself with that action and then ceased to exist, so it is not available to be the agent of the second action.



12.5

In the case of cognitions, just as in the case of physical actions, we have a two-tier model replaced by a one-tier one. The subject of consciousness is dissolved into consciousness itself. The existence of a thinker separate from thoughts, or a perceiver separate from perceptions, is denied. Neither cognitions, nor physical movements, are seen as actions that require an ontologically distinct actor, but rather simply as events that occur in a particular psychophysical stream.

The absence of a continuous agent was unacceptable to the Naiyāyikas and the other Brahmanical schools, because of its corollary that the thing that performs an action is not the same as the thing that experiences the fruit of that action subsequently. This seemed unjust: why should one thing experience the positive or negative consequences of an action performed by something else?

For Buddhism, that is just the way it is. A planted seed turns into a shoot, a stalk, leaves, a flower, and then a fruit. No one would say that it is unjust for the fruit to accrue to the flower and not the seed. It is in the nature of things that the seed has turned into something different by the time the fruit comes along. Similarly an action is performed and by the time the fruit of that action occurs, the stream that performed it has become something different.<sup>14</sup> The result does not occur in a different *stream* however. That *would* be unjust.

\* \* \*

Each of the three Buddhist positions that we have just observed results from applying more general Buddhist principles to the specific case of the self. The denial of a permanent, unchanging self is a special case of the conception of the momentariness of everything. The denial of the self as a substance possessing qualities is a special case of the denial of substances over and above qualities. The denial of the self as autonomous agent is a special case of the general position that nothing stands outside the chains of causes and effects that make up the world.

#### 1.4 Buddhist argument against self as substance

Before moving to Section 2, we will look in a little more detail at two of the principal arguments in the Buddhist-Brahmanical debate over the existence of a self. How precisely does the Buddhist reject the Naiyāyika argument, given in Section 1.2 and endnote 6, for the self as substance? As already mentioned, the Buddhist denies in general the existence of substances over and above qualities. His argument focuses on the evidence of our experience. Addressing the mango example, he points out that all we can experience there are five separate qualities.<sup>15</sup> Through our eyes we can see a visible form (*rūpa*), consisting of a shape and color, through our faculty of taste we can experience a taste, and so on. But we do not experience some further possessor of those qualities, lurking behind them. None of our faculties apprehends such a thing. Neither could they in principle, given that our eyes can only sense form, our noses smells, and so on.

The case of the self is analogous. We experience states of consciousness (perceptions, desires, thoughts, etc.), so we can grant reality to them; but we do not perceive

some substrate of those states of consciousness, underpinning them, or some substance uniting them, in which they inhere. Such a thing is an ontological extravagance that results from going beyond the evidence of our experience and multiplying entities.

Could we not infer the existence of a self as the thing to which consciousness belongs? No, for the inference would require for its validity an example illustrating the existence of substances over and above qualities, of property-possessors over and above properties; but the fact that we do not need to assume the existence of a unitary mango to which its qualities belong indicates that such examples are not forthcoming.

Could we not infer the existence of a unitary mango to which the smell, taste, color, and so on belong? This could then serve as the example in the inference of a substance to which consciousness belongs. A unitary mango could be inferred as, for example, the only plausible explanation of the fact that the mango's smell, taste, color, and so on occur together. They never split off from each other. Does this not indicate that they all belong to the same thing? No, argues the Buddhist, drawing on the principle of parsimony of postulation (*kalpanālāghava*), the Indian version of "Ockham's razor." Rather than postulating an imperceptible substance to which the five properties "stick," it is more parsimonious, argues the Buddhist, to assume that they stick to each other. For how this "sticking to each other" was elaborated in terms of their forming a causal complex in which they function as co-operating causes (*sahakāripratyayas*) for each other, see Watson (2006, pp. 57–58).


To conclude: if it cannot even be proved that a mango-substance exists as the substrate of taste and so on, obviously it cannot be proved that a self-substance exists as the substrate of consciousness.<sup>16</sup>

#### 1.5 Buddhist argument against self as agent of cognition


The principal argument for the existence of the self given by such Naiyāyika authors as Vātsyāyana and Bhaṭṭa Jayanta is as follows. We are asked to envisage a situation where someone experiences pleasure from a particular kind of object, and on seeing the same kind of object later and remembering the earlier pleasure, feels desire for the object (see Figure 12.6, where P = pleasure, S = seeing, and D = desire).

Unless the earlier pleasure and the later seeing of the object had the same subject, the desire would not arise. After all, points out the Naiyāyika, we do not find desire arising in one person (Y) as a result of pleasure in another (X) (Figure 12.7).

So if one person were not one subject, as assumed in Figure 12.6, but a plurality of subjects (as depicted in Figure 12.8), surely desire would not arise. Why would a subsequent subject of experience desire something that caused pleasure not to it, but to some totally different subject of experience?



12.6



12.7



12.8

The fact that people do desire things that have previously given them pleasure indicates that it is the same thing that is the agent of both the desire and the earlier pleasure.

That is the Naiyāyika argument. It gains its plausibility from likening the situations depicted in Figures 12.7 and 12.8. It rests on the claim that since desire does not arise in the first of these situations, it would not arise in the second. But the Buddhist has perfectly adequate means at his disposal for distinguishing the two. Two people are not analogous to two moments within the same stream: the latter are joined by a causal chain; the former are not. Thus in the situation represented in Figure 12.8, the final subject is linked by a chain of cause and effect back to the earlier pleasure, such that it has access to memory traces (*samskāras*) of the pleasure. Person Y, by contrast, does not have access to memory traces of person X's pleasure, and *that is why*—according to the Buddhist—desire does not arise in person Y.

The validity of the argument requires that the reason desire does not arise when there are two people (Figure 12.7) is because of a lack of sameness of subject. But the Buddhist has a plausible alternative: that it is due to a lack of a chain of causation along which traces can be transmitted. So long as this alternative remains unrefuted, difference of subject will not be sufficient to logically preclude the rise of desire. Hence the occurrence of desire will not entail sameness of subject.

In order for the argument to work, the Naiyāyika has to prove that desire can only arise in the same subject that experienced the earlier pleasure. He tries to do that by pointing out that when desire does occur, it is in the same subject as that of the pleasure (Figure 12.6), not a different one (Figure 12.7). But the Buddhist just replies that a single person is not a single subject, but a plurality of different ones (as in Figure 12.8).

Thus this is not an argument that forces any shift in the Buddhist position; it requires for its validity that a single person is a single subject, but that is exactly what is in question. Neither the argument from consciousness as a quality requiring a support nor this one from desire as requiring the same subject as the pleasure that gave rise to it oblige the Buddhist to rethink.<sup>17</sup>

## 2 Śaiva Siddhānta

Having observed the Naiyāyika and the Buddhist positions, we will now introduce Śaiva Siddhānta. First we will see how that tradition differentiates itself from Nyāya. As representative of Śaiva Siddhānta we will take Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha (950–1000), who was the most influential and prolific of the early Saiddhāntika exegetes, that is to say those writers belonging to the phase of this tradition that came to an end in the twelfth century, after which it survived only in the Tamil-speaking south, where it was transformed under the influence of Vedānta and devotionalism (*bhakti*). Rāmakaṇṭha was Kashmirian, as were most of the early exegetes of this tradition.

### 2.1 Śaiva Siddhānta against Nyāya


Rāmakaṇṭha does not think that Naiyāyika arguments are capable of establishing a self. He counters them by agreeing with Buddhist arguments against them. His responses to the Naiyāyika argument for the self as substance to which qualities belong and the Naiyāyika argument for the self as subject of cognition are exactly the Buddhist responses outlined in the last two sections.<sup>18</sup>

He agrees with Buddhism that there is no self as substance over and above consciousness, and no self as agent over and above consciousness. For him, as for Buddhism, consciousness does not require something other than itself in which to inhere. He concurs with Buddhism that the perceiver of our perceptions, the thinker of our thoughts, is just consciousness (*grāhaka/jñātṛ = jñāna*).

### 2.2 Śaiva Siddhānta between Nyāya and Buddhism

How then does he preserve the self? For him consciousness *is* the self. He equates the self and consciousness, or to put it another way, he characterizes consciousness as the nature (*svabhāva*) of the self.<sup>19</sup> This means that he holds consciousness to be permanent, not momentary, as it is for both Buddhism and Nyāya.<sup>20</sup> Although consciousness for Nyāya belongs to a permanent self, it itself consists of discrete, momentary instances, as in Buddhism. The difference between the three views is represented in Figure 12.9.

For Nyāya, there is a self that is separate from consciousness. For Buddhism there is no self. For Rāmakaṇṭha, there is a self but it is just consciousness. Rāmakaṇṭha crosses



12.9

out the line but joins up the dots into a line. He travels down the path of Buddhist argumentation quite a long way: he reduces the self to the stream of consciousness. But he then argues that the stream is unchanging.

So between Buddhism and Nyāya it was a debate about the existence or nonexistence of an entity. Between Buddhism and Rāmakaṇṭha there is agreement about what exists; it is just a question of how to classify that: whether as something plural or unitary, changing or unchanging.

For Rāmakaṇṭha it is unitary and unchanging, but it is not a static entity like the self of the Naiyāyikas. It is dynamic, yet constant. Dynamic in that it is a process, the process of the shining forth of consciousness. Constant in that (1) the light of consciousness pours out always in the same form, and (2) there are no breaks in the process. Consciousness as envisaged by Rāmakaṇṭha, then, differs in two ways from consciousness as envisaged by Buddhism: it is differentiated neither qualitatively nor temporally. Consciousness for Buddhism, divided up as it is into dissimilar discrete entities, each one ceasing to exist before the next one comes into existence, resembles a light forever going on and off, and each time producing a different colored light; consciousness for Rāmakaṇṭha resembles a light that is permanently on, forever sending out light of the same color. This constant pouring forth of the illuminating light of consciousness is precisely what the self is, just as the sun is nothing more than a constant pouring forth of light.


The difference of Rāmakaṇṭha's position from that of Buddhism will now be further elaborated.

### 2.3 Śaiva Siddhānta against Buddhism

Rāmakaṇṭha argues that as we proceed through life, experiencing various objects of perception, we never lose a sense that it is me who is the experiencer of those objects.<sup>21</sup> The Buddhist accepts that we have this sense of unbroken personal identity, but he claims that it is mistaken. To be precise, he maintains that our direct, nonconceptual (*nirvikalpaka*) experience of ourselves is of a sequence of distinct momentary perceivers, but that we superimpose the concept of oneness on to that plurality. It is like the example mentioned earlier of a plurality of distinct film images appearing as one continuous image. Or, to use the Buddhists' own example, like a very calm river that looks like one stable, unchanging piece of water, despite being lots of different bits of water rushing by.<sup>22</sup>

I give here two of Rāmakaṇṭha's arguments against the coherence of this Buddhist position.

1. It is possible that with regard to a sequence of entities *external* to us, we might be fooled by the rapidity with which they succeed each other and the similarity of each one to the previous, into mistaking the plurality for a unity. But the Buddhist is asking us to believe that a sequence of momentary perceivers could fool themselves, as though the distinct film images, or the bits of water in the river, could (if they were conscious) deceive themselves into thinking that they are one unbroken thing, or could experience themselves as one unbroken thing. This seems much less plausible.<sup>23</sup>



12.10

2. In the standard example of superimposition, namely, that of silver on to mother-of-pearl, it is clear that we would not mistake the mother-of-pearl for silver unless we had experienced silver previously. But in a Dharmakīrtian universe, in which everything—both perceivers and perceived objects—is momentary, how could a perceiver ever have experienced something enduring, in order to acquire the concept of duration, in order to superimpose it on to what is momentary?<sup>24</sup>

So Rāmakaṇṭha's view is that although the objects of our experience change, consciousness itself, the perceiver, is constant. This asymmetry was problematic for Dharmakīrtian Buddhism, committed as it was to the non-difference of perceiver and perceived objects (*grāhyagrāhakābheda*). This non-difference entails that any change in what is perceived necessitates a change in the perceiver. If the object of our experience changed from a pot to a cloth, and yet there was no change in consciousness, how would consciousness have registered the change in the object? The very way in which consciousness perceives an object is by being marked by that object.

Rāmakaṇṭha does not see why that should be so. When light—an analogy that the Buddhists also use to elucidate the nature of consciousness—illuminates an object, we do not regard that object as coloring the light, marking it or modifying it in any way.<sup>25</sup> So similarly for Rāmakaṇṭha consciousness is the illuminator of objects but is itself unaffected by them. Experience changes because different objects come within the range of the light of consciousness, not because consciousness itself changes.<sup>26</sup>

Rāmakaṇṭha points out that the Buddhists themselves do not hold consistently to the position that consciousness is differentiated by its objects. For they accept that at one moment a single, undivided perceiver can perceive a multicolored object. If in one moment consciousness can be single and yet perceive a plurality of different objects, why cannot one temporally extended consciousness perceive a plurality of objects? If a relationship of one perceiver to many objects is possible at one point of time, what reason is there to deny the possibility of such a relationship over time?<sup>27</sup> See Figure 12.10, where consciousness is represented above, and its perceived object(s) below.

### 3.1 Questioning Śaiva Siddhānta's location in the middle ground

We have seen, then, that there are ways in which Śaiva Siddhānta falls closer to Buddhism than Nyāya does. That is how Rāmakaṇṭha himself presents it. He sides with Buddhism against Nyāya, presenting the Naiyāyika position as one of ontological extravagance. In effect he says: We Śaivas, just like you Buddhists, recognize that a Naiyāyika self beyond consciousness is a fiction. We don't postulate such an

unperceived entity. For us, as for you, consciousness does not require something other than itself in which to inhere. We accept no agent of consciousness separate from consciousness: for us as for you, the perceiver of our perceptions, the thinker of our thoughts, is just consciousness.

But insofar as Śaiva Siddhānta too postulates a self that is completely unchanging and unmodifiable (*avikārya*), its view still occupies an extreme position. There is a sense, in fact, in which Śaiva Siddhānta's view is even more extreme than Nyāya's. Śaiva Siddhānta's self is arguably even more removed from change than Nyāya's, since individual cognitions inhere in the latter, whereas for Śaiva Siddhānta (as for Sāṅkhya) individual cognitions belong not to the self but to the *buddhi*, the faculty of intellect (responsible for conceptualization [*vikalpa*] and determining [*adhyavasāya*]).

I would now like to point to some problems with Śaiva Siddhānta's idea of an unchanging, unmodifiable self—an idea which I see as shared also by Nyāya and Sāṅkhya (and Advaita Vedānta, although its distinction between the individual self, *jīva*, and the absolute Self places it in a slightly different position). Below I will respond to possible objections against it being attributable to Nyāya.

### 3.2 Critique of an unchanging self

As we saw above, Buddhists argue against the idea of an unchanging perceiver on the grounds that if it is unaffected by changes in its objects, it would not be able to register those changes, that is, would not be able to perceive them. Śaiva Siddhānta (like Sāṅkhya) replies that the *buddhi* is modified. Since the *buddhi*, a faculty internal to the subject, registers object-changes, the subject can perceive them. But that just relocates the problem from the boundary between self and objects to the boundary between self and *buddhi*. How can the self, if it is unmodifiable, detect changes in the *buddhi*?<sup>28</sup> It is not sufficient for Śaiva Siddhānta to adduce the example of light, an illuminator which is unaffected by the objects it illuminates. For light does not perceive the objects it illuminates, it enables them to be perceived by someone's consciousness. If that consciousness is in no way affected by the objects and the light, it remains mysterious how it could perceive them.

Śaiva Siddhānta claims, furthermore, that the self is itself perceived (at all times). But can any other example be given of something that is perceived and permanently unchanging? Do not all objects of perception change over time? Are not the only things that don't change concepts, universals? Yet none of the defenders of the self want it to be a mere concept. To claim that the self is available to introspection is hard to reconcile with the claim that it exists beyond all change.

Those two objections are applicable also to Sāṅkhya and Advaita Vedānta. But Śaiva Siddhānta, unlike those two, maintains that the self is an agent, and that lays it open to a third objection. How can the agent, that which brings about action, exist always in the same form? If it is unmodifiable, how could it produce a certain response at one time and a different response at a subsequent time?

Rāmakaṇṭha can respond that though the self does not change, the conditioning (*bhāvanā*) that operates on the mind does.<sup>29</sup> This change in mental conditioning means that the self's habits can change. At one time it can be pulled in one direction,

at another time in another. But this response is not compelling. If the self's choices are made not by it, but by forces external to it, then it is just a passive plaything that is manipulated and that offers no input into decision-making. If it is the self that chooses what to do, it is very difficult to see how it can be unmodified. The fact that it chooses one thing at one time and one thing at another implies a difference in it.

An analogy that Rāmakaṇṭha is fond of using to explain how something unchanging can be an agent is that of a magnet.<sup>30</sup> The magnet, despite not moving, can cause movement in iron filings; similarly a self, despite never being modified, can cause the body with which it is currently associated to move in various ways. But the analogy would only render plausible that an unmodifiable self could act in different ways at different times if the magnet were capable of making (identical) iron filings move in one way in one situation and in another way in another (identical) situation.

Those three objections are all of the kind that we meet in the classical Indian discussions themselves. I now mention some from a more contemporary perspective. One of the problems with the concept of a subject of experience that is completely unmodifiable is that it is of use in so few discourses. Psychology, history, and (auto-)biographical literature all require a concept of the individual as something that is capable of changing, growing, developing, regressing. And an unchanging self will be of little use to those who believe that the postulates of philosophy should be naturalizable, that is, should be capable of taking their place in the empirical sciences. What use would they have for something that undergoes no change itself and hence can contribute to no change in anything else? Such an entity looks a priori undiscoverable.

These considerations carry only so much weight. Why, after all, should the postulates of philosophy need to be sanctioned by disciplines outside philosophy? But an unmodifiable self, rather like a person-like God, is susceptible to a two-pronged attack: not only can its plausibility be challenged, but also deep-rooted psychological motives for belief in it can be identified, the combination of these two making it appear as a piece of wishful thinking. What are these psychological motives? It answers a need for some post to cling to in a world full of unwanted change, a reliable counterpoint to the unpredictable flow of life and its unwelcome twists. It offers hope to that part of us that would rather not be muddled by life's torments, that prefers to be uninvolved and clean rather than enmeshed and bruised. By affirming an eternally calm, still part of us, it proclaims victory over the painful and turbulent experiences we dislike. As such, it can be seen as a reaction to and compensation for feeling insecure and insignificant.

### 3.3 Diagnosis

Inasmuch as Śaiva Siddhānta postulates a self that is completely unmodifiable, it too can be placed with Nyāya. At one end of the spectrum we have the Kṣaṇikavādins, the Buddhist proponents of momentariness, according to whom we are different in every single moment—not only qualitatively but also numerically. At the other end of the spectrum we can place Nyāya, Śaiva Siddhānta, and Sāṅkhya for whom what we are, essentially, is a self that is not only unitary over time, but also eternally unchanging. We thus have a polarized debate with each of two extremes attacking the other extreme,

and no one adopting or attacking the middle ground. The view that we could be a self that changes—that has numerical identity but qualitative change—is mostly ignored.

Some will here object that that is precisely the Nyāya position. They will claim that a Naiyāyika self changes over time in the sense that it has changing cognitions and so on inhering in it. But Naiyāyikas assert that the self and its cognitions are quite separate from each other. Any substance is a separate entity from its qualities, for Nyāya, in accordance with its doctrine of *guṇaguṇibheda*, the difference of qualities from that which possesses the qualities. Moreover, the ontological distance between a self and its qualities—cognitions, pleasure, pain, desire, and so on—is even greater than that between a physical substance and its qualities. For the self is eternal, its particular qualities are momentary; it is omnipresent, and they are restricted to a particular place. This firm separation between the self and its qualities means that Nyāya ends up with the view that despite cognitions and so on inhering in the self, changes in the former do not affect the nature of the latter.<sup>31</sup> That it is correct to attribute to Nyāya the view that changes in the self's qualities do not affect the self's nature is confirmed by passages dealing with liberation (*apavarga*, *mokṣa*). In such passages Naiyāyika authors assert that the self's nature is, and always has been, free of all of its particular qualities (*sakalaguṇāpoḍha*).<sup>32</sup> These qualities are thus irrelevant to its nature.<sup>33</sup> They are part of the “not-self” with which it confuses itself while in *saṃsāra*,<sup>34</sup> and they are “to be abandoned” (*hātavya*, *heya*).<sup>35</sup> At liberation it becomes free of them and in so doing rests in its true nature alone.

I suggest that the explanation for this polarization of the debate—for the reluctance of these traditions to occupy the middle ground—lies in a shared assumption: the assumption that if an entity changes, it can no longer be the same thing, that is, that at the level of the fundamental constituents of the world there can be no qualitative change without numerical change.

This is an explicitly stated presupposition of the Kṣaṇikavādins. It is what carries much of the weight in Dharmakīrti's inference of momentariness—leading to the postulation of consciousnesses that are numerically differentiated down to the level of every single moment. It can also be detected in Śaiva Siddhānta<sup>36</sup> and Nyāya and is what explains their refusal to allow any change on the part of the self. For if it is accepted, then any change in the nature of a self will entail that that self ceases to exist and is succeeded by another. The concept “self” would then no longer be applicable; the Buddhist position would have been lapsed into.

## 4 Between an unchanging self and momentariness

### 4.1 Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā and Jainism

Does no one assert the existence of a self that is changing? Is the genuinely middle ground totally unoccupied? No, two traditions can be placed there: Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā and Jainism.

The originator of the former, Kumārila, explicitly rejects the prevalent presupposition that qualitative change entails numerical change. He puts the following objection into the mouth of an opponent: surely if the self is transformed, it cannot be eternal.<sup>37</sup> He then

responds that if non-eternal (*anitya*) means just being liable to transformation (*vikriyā*), he has no problem calling the self non-eternal. But the self is certainly not subject to destruction (*uccheda*, *nāśa*); for to be modified (and to be non-eternal in *that* sense) is not to cease to exist but rather just to “assume another state” (*avasthāntaraprāpti*).<sup>38</sup> Some aspects of the self are permanent and some (its states or qualities) are impermanent. Examples of the former are its consciousness (*caitanya*), its existence (*sattā*), and the particular substance (*dravya*) that comprises it; examples of the latter are its pleasures and pains. It is compared to a snake coiling into different positions, or a piece of gold that is remolded from a dish to a necklace to an earring.<sup>39</sup> The snake itself and the gold atoms stand for its unchanging aspects; the different positions of the snake and the different shapes of the gold stand for its changing aspects.

Kumārila and those in his tradition refer to the self's pleasure, pain, and so on not just as its “states” (*avasthā*), but also its “qualities” (*guṇa*) or “properties” (*dharma*). In that case how is this view different from that of the Naiyāyikas? In both cases we have a permanent substance (*dravya*) with changing qualities/properties. It is different because Kumārila has a different take on the relation between substances and their qualities; he specifies the relation not as difference/separateness (*bheda*), but rather as both difference and non-difference/separateness and non-separateness (*bhedābheda*). This closer connection, or blurred boundary, between a substance and its qualities means that—unlike for the Naiyāyikas—modification of the latter *does* entail modification of the former. Kumārila has no problem accepting that the self is modified.

The same goes for Jainism. It distinguishes between the essence (*bhāva*, *jāti*) of the self and its modes (*pariyāya*).<sup>40</sup> But the two sides of this distinction are (unlike for the Naiyāyikas and as for Kumārila) not completely different/separate from each other; they are rather different aspects of the same thing. So one and the same self-substance is permanent and unchanging when viewed from one point of view, and impermanent and changing when viewed from another. Its permanence must be indexed to one aspect of it, namely, its essence; if it were completely permanent (*sarvathā nityatve*),<sup>41</sup> it could not be transformed, so the good conduct which causes someone to cease transmigrating would not be able to have any effect on it.<sup>42</sup>

There is much similarity between the Bhāṭṭa and the Jaina views, as brought out by Uno (1999). But one dissimilarity is that for the Jainas the self, though immaterial, changes its size; it occupies the same dimensions as the body with which it is currently associated (*svadehaparimāṇa*). It is thus subject to contraction (*saṃharāṇa*) and expansion (*visarpaṇa*).<sup>43</sup>

For both the Bhāṭṭas and the Jainas the self is one numerically identical thing that changes. Although these two traditions allow more change in the self than any of the other self-theorists, they only allow so much. In order to see what I mean by this, consider the example of the boat that over time has had all of its parts replaced. This would not serve as a valid analogy for a Jaina or Bhāṭṭa self, because the boat's numerical identity—if it is even considered numerically identical—consists not in it being the very same substance, composed of the same stuff, but in other factors such as continuity of structure and an uninterrupted spatiotemporal path. For Kumārila the stuff out of which the self is composed is eternal (that is the point of the gold analogy with its eternal gold atoms), whereas in the case of the boat there is nothing that continues to

exist throughout the entire span of its life. Both the boat and a Bhāṭṭa/Jaina self are “one thing that changes,” but such a definition is not sufficient to capture the Bhāṭṭa or Jaina conception of self, for selfhood was taken by both to require a strong sense of numerical identity. Yes it can change, but to count as a self it must also be numerically identical in the strong sense of being the very same substance, composed of the same stuff, with no change whatsoever in its essence. With that we reach the limit of the self-theorists; any attempt to preserve numerical identity but in a weak sense—analogueous to that of the boat—will count as a Buddhist view rather than a self-view.<sup>44</sup> This worry that too much change cannot be admitted of the self can be observed in the Jaina view that changes in the self’s size—in the amount of space it takes up to fit its current body—do not involve any change in its “weight” (it has *agurulaghutva* = never gets heavier or lighter) or “innate extent”: “whether a given body is as large as the entire *loka-ākāśa* or as small as the tiniest object imaginable, the number of the soul’s space-points remains the same.”<sup>45</sup> This is explained by the analogy of a cloth, whose mass never alters however many shapes it is folded into.<sup>46</sup> Here again, then, we see that the self’s changes must coexist with no change in its essence, compositional stuff, or nature as substance.

We have reached the location on the spectrum we are delineating at which we pass from the self-views to the Buddhist views.

#### 4.2 Two more Buddhist views

We have so far been using the expression “the Buddhist view” to refer to that of momentariness-theorists (Kṣaṇikavādins) such as Vasubandhu, Dharmakīrti, and their followers. That is because non-Buddhists, when they set about proving a self, took the momentariness-theorists to be representative of Buddhism. But two other Buddhist views will be mentioned here. The first view we meet after crossing the boundary into the Buddhist side of the spectrum is that of the Personalists (Pudgalavādins). They felt that the unqualified denial of a self on the part of their fellow Buddhists was not true to the Buddha’s teaching, especially to those passages in which he is depicted as rejecting both the view that there is a self and the view that there is not. They thus postulated a “person” (*pudgala*) that cannot be said to be either the same as or different from the psychophysical constituents (*skandha*).

If it were the same as the constituents, they reasoned, then it would be as momentary as them, and memory, rebirth, and moral responsibility would be difficult to account for. If it were independent from them, then it would be as eternal and unconditioned as a Sāṅkhya or Naiyāyika self (*atman*), and hence all the problems that Buddhists see with such an entity ensue: it cannot enter into a mutual relationship with psychophysical reality, it would seem to be already liberated and so makes the religious life redundant, and so on. The Personalists regarded their view as taking the proper middle way between the two extremes of eternalism and annihilationism.<sup>47</sup>

They compared the relationship between the constituents and the person to that between a tree and its shadow, or fuel and the fire rising from that. As Eltschinger and Ratié (2013, pp. 73–75) perceptively note, four aspects of the analogies seem to have been intended. (1) The shadow is neither the same as nor different from the tree,


and the fire is neither the same as nor different from the fuel. (2) The shadow and the fire exist, but in a less substantial and determinate way than the tree and the fuel. (3) There is no shadow without the tree and no fire without the fuel. (4) The shadow and the fire are *caused by*, respectively, the tree and the fuel. The person, then, is a kind of epiphenomenon thrown up by the constituents; it cannot exist without them, but it is not reducible to them.

It is not difficult to distinguish this “person” from the self of the Naiyāyikas, Śaiva Siddhāntins, and so on; but there is some overlap between it and the self of the Bhāṭṭas and Jainas. As the former is neither the same as nor different from the constituents, so the latter is neither the same as nor different from (or rather both the same as and different from) the self’s qualities such as its pleasures, pains, and cognitions. In what way, then, are the two concepts distinct? (1) A Bhāṭṭa or a Jaina self is not caused by its qualities. (2) It *can* exist without them—in the state of liberation and between incarnations. (3) It is not less substantial or determinate than its qualities. (4) It is a substance; the person is not. (5) It is eternal; the person is neither eternal nor momentary.

The “person” of the Pudgalavādins thus falls between an enduring self-substance (as upheld by the Bhāṭṭas and Jainas) and the transient constituents (*skandha*). The next view on the spectrum—let us call it “Buddhism without momentariness”—is one that was not, to my knowledge, actually put forward by any Buddhists. It is a product of my reflection and a sense that there is conceptual space here for a “Buddhistic” view that fits between the two properly Buddhist views dealt with in this chapter. It and the momentariness view of the Kṣaṇikavādins fall together, against the Personalists, in asserting that an individual consists in nothing more than the constituents. What separates the two of them is that for the former the constituents are temporally extended, for the latter they are momentary.

The “Buddhist-without-momentariness” view is represented in Figure 12.11.


The five rows represent the five kinds of constituent. If we take the top row as consciousness (*vijñāna-skandha*), each rectangle in that row denotes an instance of consciousness. All of these instances will be transient; some may last only for a moment, most for longer, but none forever. The same goes for the other four constituents. One kind of constituent, a feeling say, may or may not begin and end at the same time as another, an impulse or an instance of consciousness say. It is very unlikely that instances of all five constituents will stop and start at the same time. Thus this view avoids what some held to be a problematic feature of momentariness—that there are breaks in the process, that an individual is completely destroyed (in every moment) before arising again in the next, and that this seems equivalent to annihilationism. On this view there are no breaks in the process, no destruction of an individual, because at the point where one kind of constituent ceases, others will be existent. The overlapping of the constituents avoids annihilationism.



12.11

## Conclusion

The chapter began by distinguishing four groups of classical Indian philosophical traditions. Having looked at several of the traditions that belong in the third and fourth groups—at the positions they take on the issue of selfhood and personal identity—we see that they can be arranged along the following spectrum.



## Notes

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1. See Watson, Goodall, and Sarma (2013, pp. 27–35).
2. I thank the *Journal of Indian Philosophy* for allowing me to reproduce material in sections 1 and 2 that I have already published there in Watson (2014b).
3. See *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* pp. 473,20–23; Duerlinger (2003, p. 99).
4. As to *why* Buddhists asserted the momentariness of both mental and physical entities—why they explained change not as one thing becoming modified, but rather as a succession of distinct momentary things—see Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇaviniścaya* 2:53–55, *Vādanyāya* p. 2,1–3,13 and *Hetubindu* p. 4\*,6–7, p. 19,10–13; and Dharmottara's *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā* ad 2:53–55 and *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi*. See also Steinkellner (1963; 1968/69), Mimaki (1976), von Rospatt (1995), Yoshimizu (1999), and Sakai (2010a, b; 2011).
5. These four kinds of mental state are: feelings (*vedanā*), ideation (*sañjñā*), impulses (*saṃskāra*), and consciousness (*vijñāna*); see Vetter (2000).
6. The argument involves three contentions, each of which had their own supporting arguments: (1) Qualities cannot exist without substances to which they belong; (2) consciousness, desire, aversion, pleasure, pain, volition are qualities; (3) the self is the only possible substance to which these qualities could belong. See *Nyāyavārttika* ad 1.1.10, p. 62,12–18, and *Praśastapādabhāṣya* p. 16,3–7. For the second stage of the argument in particular, see *Nyāyavārttika* ad 3.2.18, *Nyāyamañjarī* vol. 2, p. 278,14–15, and Candrānanda ad *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 2.2.28. For the third stage of the argument, see, for example, *Nyāyamañjarī* vol. 2, pp. 284,6–293,2 and *Nyāyasūtra* 3.2.47 with the commentaries ad loc. See also Chakrabarti (1982), Oetke (1988, pp. 255–256, 258–260, 280, 286–300, 359–360, 464), Matilal (1989, pp. 74, 77; 1994, p. 286), Preisendanz (1994, pp. 187, 209, 278–281), Kano (2001), and Watson (2006, pp. 174–184).
7. See *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* pp. 475,14–16 and 475,22–476,3; Duerlinger (2003, pp. 103 and 104).

8. The concept “mango,” for Buddhism, corresponds to no reality, but is a false unity that we superimpose on to something plural, like the concept “forest.” To use Vasubandhu's terminology in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, forests and mangoes are *prajñaptisat*, not *dravyasat* (see, e.g., p. 461,14ff.): they have merely conceptual, not substantial, existence.
9. The four *skandhas* that Buddhism groups with *vijñāna* (consciousness)—*rūpa*, *vedanā*, *sañjñā*, *saṃskāra*—are of course not the same as the qualities of the self that Nyāya groups with *jñāna* (consciousness): *icchā*, *dveṣa*, *prayatna*, *sukha*, *duḥkha* (*Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.10).
10. See *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* p. 476,1–2, *Mataṅgavṛtti*, *vidyāpāda* p. 153,8–11 and *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* introducing 1:5, p. 11,1–4.
11. See *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* introducing 1:5, p. 11,4–6.
12. See *Praśastapādabhāṣya* p. 15,12 and Candrānanda ad *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 3.2.4, p. 28,18–19.
13. See *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* pp. 476,19–477,3; Duerlinger (2003, p. 107).
14. See *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* p. 477,11–17; Duerlinger (2003, p. 108).
15. See *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa*, *avatārikā* to 1.5 (p. 11,1–6), *Kiraṇavṛtti* ad 2:25ab (p. 53,4–8), *Mataṅgavṛtti*, *vidyāpāda* p. 153,8–11, and Watson (2006, pp. 184–192; 2010a, pp. 87–89).
16. This strategy of Buddhist argument goes back to the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. The opponent there states that the self is required as the support (*āśraya*) of consciousness (*citta*) and traces (*saṃskāra*), in the way that earth supports its qualities such as smell. Vasubandhu replies that the example of earth is exactly what convinces him that there is no self. The fact that we perceive only a certain combination of smell and other properties, not some extra entity “earth” supporting them, indicates that there is no such entity, and this indicates that, analogously, there is no self supporting consciousness and traces (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* pp. 475,14–16; Duerlinger [2003, p. 103]). On Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla's refutation of the view that desire and other states of consciousness require a support, see Hulin (1978, pp. 100–101).
17. Versions of this argument are found at *Nyāyabhāṣya* ad 1.1.10, p. 16,5–20, *Nyāyavārttika* ad 1.1.10, pp. 60,12–63,2, *Nyāyamañjarī* pp. 278,4–284,5; see also Oetke (1988, pp. 345–352 and 256–258), Matilal (1989, pp. 74–77; 1994, pp. 286 and 289–291), Taber (1990, pp. 36–37), Preisendanz (1994, pp. 202, 306), and Kapstein (2001, pp. 146–151 and 375–383). Apart from the earliest, that of the Vṛttikāra in the *Śābarabhāṣya*, they all appeal to the concept of synthesis (*pratisandhāna*, *anusandhāna*). Desire would not arise, it is argued, were it not for the subject's ability to synthesize the earlier pleasure with the present seeing of the object. One can only synthesize cognitions of which one is the subject. Therefore the earlier pleasure and the present seeing must have the same subject. But, replies the Buddhist, why is it the case that only cognitions having the same subject can be synthesized? What is required for synthesis, as the Naiyāyika also recognizes, is the activation of a memory trace of the earlier cognition. Why is this not enough? Why do the Naiyāyikas also insist on a further requirement, namely, sameness of subject?

At this point certain Naiyāyikas give a verbalization of the synthesis, such as “Earlier I derived pleasure from this object, and now this same I am experiencing it again”; and argue that such a cognition would not arise unless I were indeed the subject of both the earlier pleasure and the present seeing. It is true, replies the Buddhist, that such a cognition implies that I sense myself as the subject of both the present and the past experiences of the object. But this sense of sameness is easily

explainable as resulting from the rapidity with which consecutive momentary subjects succeed each other, and the similarity of each one to the previous; this fools us into superimposing oneness on to what is actually multiple. Some Naiyāyikas put forward synthesis as verbalized above not as a means of inferring the self, but as including a direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) of the self. But this is countered on the grounds that it assumes what the argument sets out to prove: the validity of such seeming experiences of an enduring subject.

Even some Naiyāyikas regard the argument as a failure (those that Jayanta refers to as *svayūthya*, “those of our own fold”), pointing out that it can only work if it asserts that synthesis includes direct perception of an enduring subject. But if such a subject is available to *pratyakṣa*, then this whole inference from desire becomes pointless (*Nyāyamañjarī* p. 277,14–17).

Furthermore even proponents of the argument such as Uddyotakara and Jayanta allow their Buddhist interlocutors (*pūrvapakṣins*) to overcome the various Naiyāyika strategies they put forward. They see its success as dependent on an independent refutation of the coherence of momentariness. Thus Uddyotakara allows his opponent to answer each of his points until at the end he argues that a momentary entity would not be able to leave a trace on another momentary entity, whether the latter existed contemporaneously with it or immediately after it (*Nyāyavārttika* p. 62,19–63,2; see also Taber [2012]). Similarly, throughout Jayanta’s long discussion the opponent is able to answer all of Jayanta’s assertions, and the debate is only closed when Jayanta asserts that he will explain later in the chapter that there can be no relation of cause and effect between momentary cognitions (*Nyāyamañjarī* vol. 2, p. 284,3–4).

For a more detailed analysis of the argument and its history, see Watson (2006, pp. 138–157 and 159–165). Note that it is different from, though sometimes mistakenly conflated with, the arguments we find in the commentaries to *Nyāyasūtra* 3.1.1, which are also often put in terms of synthesis (*pratisandhāna*). The argument that we have been examining is based on cognitions at different points of time being synthesized by a single entity, who must therefore exist continually over that time span. The arguments in the commentaries to 3.1.1 are based on perceptions from different sense-faculties being synthesized by a single entity, who must therefore exist over and above the individual sense-faculties. What is aimed to be proved is not necessarily an entity that endures over time, but one that exists above and beyond the plurality of sense-faculties. On these arguments based on 3.1.1, see Halbfass (1976, p. 163), Matilal (1986, pp. 252–254, 372), Oetke (1988, pp. 260–269), Taber (1990, pp. 39–42), Laine (1993), Preisendanz (1994, pp. 183–187), Chakrabarti (1992) and Ganeri (2000; 2007, pp. 180–181).

18. For his response to the first Naiyāyika argument, see *Nareśvaraparikṣāprakāśa*, *avatārikā* to 1.5, p. 11,1–6, *Kiraṇāvṛtti* ad 2:25ab (p. 53,4–8), *Mataṅgavṛtti*, *vidyāpāda* pp. 153,8–11, and Watson (2006, pp. 184–192; 2010a, pp. 87–89). For his response to the second, see *Nareśvaraparikṣāprakāśa* introducing 1:5, pp. 9,10–10,8, and Watson (2006, pp. 138–159 and 240, n. 99).
19. The view that consciousness is the nature of the self may appear to some as not so different from the view that it is a quality/property of the self; talk of a thing’s “properties” in English can seem more or less synonymous with talk of its “nature.” But in Indian philosophical discourse whereas the relation between a thing and its nature was held to be identity, sameness (*tādātmya*), the relation between a thing and its qualities (*guṇas*) or properties (*dharmas*) was held to be inherence (*samavāya*).

A thing and its nature are the same thing; a thing and its qualities/properties are not—the latter belong to the thing, but are of a different nature.

20. His view may remind some readers of either Sāṅkhya or Advaita Vedānta; for an analysis of the differences of his view from both of these, see Watson (2010a).
21. *Nareśvaraparikṣāprakāśa* ad 1:5, pp. 13,20–14,18; Watson (2006, pp. 220–230).
22. *Nareśvaraparikṣāprakāśa* ad 1:5, pp. 14,18–15,5; Watson (2006, pp. 230–236).
23. That a sequence of momentary perceivers could deceive themselves is also contradicted—according to Rāmakaṇṭha—by the Buddhist assertion that all cognition is nonconceptual with regard to itself: see Watson (2010b, pp. 302–303; 2006, pp. 237–238, 245–251). For a discussion of what precisely Dharmakīrti means by cognition being nonconceptual with regard to itself, see Watson (2010b, pp. 317–319).
24. This point is an extrapolation of Rāmakaṇṭha’s thinking, rather than a close report of what he has written. His account of why superimposition would be impossible if everything were momentary (see *sarveṣāṃ kṣaṇikatvena yojanānupapatteḥ* at *Nareśvaraparikṣāprakāśa* ad 1:5, p. 15,17–18, in a passage translated and analyzed at Watson [2006, pp. 238–245]) focuses more on superimposition requiring an enduring perceiver than on it requiring experience of duration.
25. For discussion of the light analogy, see Watson (2010b, p. 305; 2014a) and Watson and Kataoka (2010, pp. 304–306).
26. See, for example, *Nareśvaraparikṣāprakāśa* ad 1.6ab, p. 26,4–13, Watson (2006, pp. 333–382; 2010a, esp. pp. 111–112).
27. For the full argument, see *Nareśvaraparikṣāprakāśa* ad 1.6ab, pp. 26,19–28,11, and Watson (2006, pp. 335–348).
28. We find Śāntaraksita (c. 725–788) arguing in exactly this way (against a Sāṅkhya opponent) in the *Tattvasaṅgraha* (294ff.); see Watson (2010a, pp. 90–95). See also Siderits (2011, p. 421).
29. Rāmakaṇṭha appeals to these changes in mental predisposition (*bhāvanā*) in the *Mataṅgavṛtti* (ad 6:34c–35a, pp. 173,11–174,1) during a defense of the unchanging nature of consciousness.
30. See index entry for “magnets” in Watson, Goodall, and Sarma (2013).
31. For an account of the evolution of the increasing distance that developed between the self and its qualities in Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, see Frauwallner (1956, pp. 91–104; 1984, pp. 61–71).
32. *Nyāyamañjarī* vol. 2, pp. 359,6: *sakalaguṇāpodham evāsya rūpam*.
33. They are described as extrinsic to it, not innate (*na naisargika*): *Nyāyamañjarī* vol. 2, p. 359,5.
34. *Nyāyabhāṣya* p. 6,9–10.
35. *Nyāyabhāṣya* p. 6,11; *Nyāyamañjarī* vol. 2, pp. 265,10–12 and 430,3–4.
36. Śaiva Saiddhāntika authors reveal their acceptance of this presupposition in the way that they respond to the Dharmakīrtian inference of momentariness. For the Dharmakīrtian Buddhists the seed that produces the sprout cannot be the same thing as the seed when it was in the granary and not producing a sprout, because the former has as its nature the ability to produce a sprout and the latter does not. Saiddhāntika authors agree that these two seed phases would be numerically distinct entities if they had different natures (*svabhāva*), and so they are forced into making the counterintuitive claim that there is no difference at all in the nature of the two-seed phases, the only difference between the two situations being the presence or absence of auxiliary causes such as earth and moisture that allow the sprout to be produced. See Watson, Goodall, and Sarma (2013, pp. 378–390) and *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti* pp. 177–181.

37. *Śloka-vārttika, ātmavāda* 21.
38. *Śloka-vārttika, ātmavāda* 22–23.
39. See *Śloka-vārttika, ātmavāda* 26–28, Pārthasārathimīśra and Jayamīśra (*Śloka-vārttikaṭīkā—Sarkarikā*) *ad loc.*, and Umbeka (*Śloka-vārttikavyākhyā—Tātparyāṭīkā*) *ad pratyakṣasūtra* 53.
40. *Sarvārthasiddhi ad* 5.29, Uno (1999, p. 424).
41. *Sarvārthasiddhi ad* 5.31.
42. Uno (1999, p. 425). See also Jaini (1979, p. 103): “the Jaina suggestion—indeed requirement—of some form of change in the soul-substance constitutes a unique and significant departure from the mainstream of Indian thought.” It does indeed constitute a departure from such mainstream traditions as Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, and Sāṅkhya, but not from Bhāṛṇa Mīmāṃsā.
43. Jaini (1979, p. 58), citing the *Rājaprasānīyasūtra* as the earliest source for this idea.
44. My thoughts here were partly derived from and partly stimulated by John Taber’s comments on an earlier version of this chapter.
45. Jaini (1979, p. 103), *Sarvārthasiddhi* § 557.
46. Jaini (1979, pp. 58–59), *Rājaprasānīyasūtra* § 67.
47. Eltschinger and Ratie (2013, p. 84).

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